The Conglomerate Merger Tangle by Rudolph, Wallace M.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 1 Article 3
1970
The Conglomerate Merger Tangle
Wallace M. Rudolph
University of Nebraska College of Law, wrudolph@thefortinlawfirm.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Wallace M. Rudolph, The Conglomerate Merger Tangle, 50 Neb. L. Rev. 193 (1971)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol50/iss1/3
THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER TANGLE
Wallace M. Rudolph*
Conglomerates such as L.T.V., I.T.T., Gulf and Western, and
Litton Industries have become widely known during the sixties.
Whatever else may have happened during this decade, a funda-
mental change has occurred in the nature of mergers. In a base
period of 1948 to 1951, 38.1 percent of all mergers were conglomerate
whereas in 1968, 91 percent of all mergers were conglomerate.' What
caused this change and what are the effects of this change for anti-
trust have been the subjects of much concern and analysis.
The conglomerate merger movement may simply be the result
of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section seven of the Clayton
Act. Basically, this amendment has made all vertical and horizontal
mergers involving substantial market percentages illegal. Thus
the rise in the percentage of conglomerate mergers may simply
result from the decline in horizontal mergers.
Nevertheless, the Justice Department has decided that conglom-
erate mergers must be stopped. The Attorney General has sug-
gested that such mergers violate one of the basic policies of the
antitrust laws. In a speech in Savannah, Georgia, he said:
The Department of Justice may very well oppose any merger
among the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable
size in other industries.
The Department of Justice will probably oppose any merger by
one of the top 200 manufacturing firms of any leading producer in
any concentrated industry.
And, of course, the Department will continue to challenge
mergers which may substantially lessen potential competition or
develop a substantial potential for reciprocity.
Some may regard these three probabilities as something of an
expansion of the published antimerger Guidelines of the Depart-
ment.
But we believe that, under today's circumstances, these prob-
abilities are clearly authorized by present antitrust law.2
The Federal Trade Commission Staff has also issued an "Eco-
nomic Report on Corporate Mergers" wherein they concluded:
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1 Address by John Mitchell, United States Attorney General, in Savan-
nah, Ga., June 6, 1969.
2 Id.
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These interrelated developments pose a serious threat to
Amercia's democratic and social institutions by creating a degree
of centralized private decision-making that is incompatible with a
free enterprise system, a system relying upon market forces to
discipline private economic power 3
The Commission recommends that action be taken to stop mer-
gers in the following situations:
(1) [W]hen the acquiring corporation is a large enterprise hav-
ing a substantial volume of sales in one or more concentrated indus-
tries. (For this purpose a large firm is defined as having annual
sales or assets in excess of $250 million.)(2) [W]hen the acquired company is one of the leading firms in
at least one concentrated industry. (A concentrated industry is de-
fined as one in which the 4 leading firms account for 40 per cent or
more of sales. A leading firm is one included among the 4 to 6
largest sellers in an industry.) 4
Clearly the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion intend to forbid the mergers of any corporations in which one
of the partners is among the top 200 firms or has assets in excess of
250 million dollars if the other partner is also one of the top 200
firms or is a leading firm in a concentrated industry, i.e., one of the
top six companies in an industry in which the top four companies
have at least forty percent of the assets. This would exclude entry
by merger into most industries5 and would forbid to these top com-
panies, for merger purposes, over sixty percent 6 of the total manu-
facturing assets.
Under such a policy, mergers are to be forbidden practically on
a per se basis without any actual showing that competition has
been lessened in any section of the country, that reciprocal buying
will occur, that potential competition is excluded, or that the new
merged entity will engage in cross-subsidization of price wars.
Obviously the Attorney General believes that one purpose of
the Sherman Act is to prevent undue concentration of assets in
any section of the country without regard to market control. He
evinces a belief that undue concentration of assets will in some way
lead to more market restraint than now exists. This same belief is
expressed by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission:
The Congress regarded monopoly and incipient monopoly as a
danger to the competitive system but also as a threat to the Na-
tion's political and social system. Indeed, a basic premise of the
American antitrust policy is the array of virtues believed to flow
from a decentralized economic system.7
3 1969 FTC STAFF, EcoNoIIc REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 5.
4 Id. at 17.
5 C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959).
6 FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 192.
7 Id. at 10.
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The courts have also recognized that the Sherman Act had a spe-
cial political bias toward decentralization.8 Thus Judge Hand in
Alcoa said:
We have been speaking only of economic reasons which forbid
monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others, based
upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently
undesirable, regardless of their economic results.... Throughout
the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that
one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own
sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in
small units which can effectively compete with each other.9
This same position was reiterated by Justice Warren when he
wrote:
[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competi-
tion through the protection of viable, small, locally owned busi-
nesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices
might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization. We must give effect to that decision. 0
Notwithstanding this agreement between the Attorney General,
the staff of the F.T.C., and the courts, no one has articulated a theory
with which judges may decide actual cases based on the premise
that some kind of concentration other than market control may be
stopped by the antitrust laws. The F.T.C. did refer, however, to a
statement by Professors Blake and Jones which presents that posi-
tion. Blake and Jones stated:
The overriding purpose of antitrust policy, we believe, is to
maintain an economy capable of functioning effectively without
creating an abundance of supervisory political machinery. More-
over, the political machinery to be avoided is not limited to state
ownership. It also includes formal government management of pri-
vately owned facilities and private administrative powers subjected
to varying degrees of informal governmental supervision-through
congressional investigations, government-industry consultations,
and executive pressure.
In short, antitrust operates to forestall concentrations of eco-
nomic power which, if allowed to develop unhindered, would call
for much more intrusive government supervision of the economy.
Reliance on competitive markets accommodates our interest in ma-
terial well-being with our distrust of concentrations of political and
economic power in private or governmental hands."1
Thus we could conclude that one goal of antitrust is to prevent
the development of countervailing power, price guidelines, calls
8 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
9 Id. at 428.
10 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
11 Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, In De-
fense of Antitrust, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 377, 383 (1965).
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for industrial statesmanship, etc. If this is all that is desired then all
we need consider is economic factors in deciding cases. Thus the
courts are called upon only to stop undue concentrations of eco-
nomic power, not undue concentrations of wealth, legal services,
corporate headquarters, and the like. The Government will still
be required to prove an increase in market power. It will not be
sufficient for the Government to claim that the leading 200 firms
now control sixty percent instead of fifty percent of all manufac-
turing assets. The function of the political bias set out in the deci-
sions is to negate the defense of efficiency. Thus even if the merged
partners could claim that they could produce more cheaply than
before, the Government might still resist the merger if it could
show that the merged corporation would not be subject to market
control and would need extra market regulation. Such a situation
is unusual and it is very doubtful that such political decisions are
necessary. Their use in Brown Shoe12 best illustrates how political
restrictions operate. In that case the claim was made that vertical
integration would improve efficiency. The Court rejected the claim
because the possibly more efficient organizations of the industry in
three out of four major vertically integrated units would mean that
the market would no longer control the production, pricing, and
distribution of shoes. This is the meaning of the political language
in the opinions, and therefore the antitrust laws still require the
Government to show, by acceptable economic theory, that some new
market power has or will come into existence as the result of a
merger.
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the Government
must allege some sort of market control arising from conglomerate
mergers if it has any hope of stopping them. The Government con-
tends that there are three kinds of market maladjustments that
occur in a large conglomerate merger: first is reciprocity, second
is the curtailment of potential competition, third is cross-subsidiza-
tion by the divisions of the conglomerate. 13 Both legal and economic
theories exist to support enjoining a merger though it is not clear
how the mere existence of a merger would result in any of the
suggested activities. This article will examine the economic and
legal theories behind reciprocity, curtailment of potential competi-
tion, and cross-subsidization and apply them to the guidelines set
out by the Justice Department and the staff of the Federal Trade
Commission.
12 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
13 FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 338-490.
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RECIPROCITY
Reciprocity means that one corporation will buy goods from
another corporation if the other corporation will buy goods from
the first corporation. Reciprocity would seem to reduce trade to
barter, a notably inefficient method of exchange. The staff of the
Federal Trade Commission gives a number of examples of such
reciprocity.14 The staff first mentions the Waugh Equipment Co.
case.15 In that case Armour Incorporated officers were given stocks
in Waugh to help promote the Waugh Company. The Waugh Com-
pany made draft gears for railroads. Officers of the Armour Com-
pany then solicited railroads to buy the Waugh Company gears.
Since Armour was a large shipper, their solicitation allowed Waugh
to move from seventh place to first in draft gears between 1924
and 1929.
The staff's second case involved General Dynamics. Liquid Car-
bonic, the largest domestic producer of carbon dioxide, was ac-
quired by General Dynamics in 1957. The carbon dioxide market
was concentrated. Liquid Carbonic had about thirty-five to forty
percent of the market, with Air Reduction the second producer.
These top two had sixty percent of the market and the top four
had seventy-five percent. Seventy-five percent of General Dynamics
Corporation's suppliers used carbon dioxide and only sixty-five
percent of Liquid Carbonic's capacity was being used at the time
of acquisition. Action was taken at the highest corporate levels
to inform General Dynamics' suppliers that they should buy from
Liquid Carbonic. The district court held in that case that reciprocal
purchasing was substantial and dissolved the merger.1
The staff's third case is Consolidated Foods.'7 Consolidated ac-
quired Gentry which is a producer of dried onions and garlic. The
normal customers of Gentry were the companies selling to Con-
solidated. The Supreme Court held that the actuality and possibility
of reciprocal purchasing made the merger illegal.
The F.T.C. mentions other cases of reciprocal buying but they
in no way explain why reciprocity comes into existence. The Com-
mission assumes that any time reciprocal buying is possible it will
exist. On the other hand, if we understand when reciprocal pur-
chasing is profitable, then we can distinguish between conglomerate
mergers that will result in reciprocal purchases and those that will
not.
14 Id. at 323.
'5 Waugh Equipment Co., 15 F.T.C. 232, 242-45 (1931).16 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) and 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
17 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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In the Waugh case, Armour was dealing with railroads during
a time when the railway rates were fixed by railroad conferences
and approved by the I.C.C.' 8 Although Armour was paying a pre-
mium to a railroad cartel, there was no way in which Armour
could get a lower price for shipping goods. Nonetheless, Armour
could help a particular railroad by giving it business. Thus the
alliance with Waugh permitted Armour (or its officers, at least) to
obtain something for giving business to particular railroads at prices
over competitive market prices. Hence Waugh received business
from the railroads at no extra cost to Armour.
The reciprocal buying in the Liquid Carbonic case also resulted
because the parties were prohibited from using price competition.
Liquid Carbonic could not successfully cut prices to increase sales,
for if it did its competitors would respond and would more than
likely keep their share of the market.19 We must also assume that
lower prices for carbon dioxide would not appreciably affect the
total amount of the gas used. Thus Liquid Carbonic was left with
thirty-five percent unused capacity. The officers of Liquid Carbonic
must have asked themselves what kind of non-price competition
would allow them to increase their utilization of their plant. Clearly,
reciprocal purchasing through merger would work for Liquid Car-
bonic since its competitors could not immediately match Carbonic's
actions. Certain reciprocal buyers could be persuaded (with pres-
sure) because prices from Liquid Carbonic were the same as its
competitors' and, as sellers to General Dynamics, the reciprocal
buyers might be charging more than a competitive price, either
because they already belonged to a cartel or because section 2 (f)
of the Robinson-Patman Act prevented them from granting a dis-
criminatory price concession.20
The case of Consolidated Foods again illustrates that reciprocal
buying may result in a hidden price cut forbidden by the Robinson-
Patman Act. Consolidated Foods, a large food processor, bought a
small dry onion and garlic processor. Under classic economic
analysis, we would expect that Consolidated would have demanded
and received the lowest price from its suppliers and therefore would
not be in a position to demand additional concessions from these
suppliers. On the other hand, there was no way for Gentry to
increase its market. Dried garlic and onion prices are inelastic;
the market was concentrated. Gentry needed a non-price method
18 49 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1920).
19 We can expect each seller will react to a price cut to retain its share
of the market in a concentrated market. Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (f),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (f) (1964).
20 Id.
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of competition in order to succeed. Hence it would benefit Con-
solidated to purchase Gentry only if Consolidated were not receiv-
ing all the possible concessions from its suppliers, which was un-
doubtedly the case.
From this analysis, we can see when reciprocal purchasing will
occur. It will occur when a major purchaser deals with suppliers
who are in a concentrated industry or who are prevented from
giving concessions to the major producer because of section 2 (f) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. Such a purchaser can buy a company
that sells to these suppliers. One might argue that if this is all that
is involved in reciprocal purchases then they are harmless since
reciprocal purchasing will allow some sort of competition where
none existed previously. Reciprocal purchasing is wrong, however,
because it does in fact foreclose the market. One seller has an
advantage that no one else has, for under such circumstances it
will not pay for anyone else either to start price competition or
to enter the market. On the other hand, if such special circum-
stances do not exist, we would not expect reciprocal buying to
occur and thus we should not stop mergers merely on the possi-
bility of such purchases.
CURTAILMENT OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION
The second reason given for prohibiting conglomerate mergers
is that they eliminate potential competitors. This elimination of
potential competitors occurs only with a special kind of conglo-
merate merger called a product extension merger.21 For example, it
is inappropriate to claim that the acquisition by L.T.V. of Jones and
Laughlin eliminated potential competition in the steel industry. On
the other hand, the acquisition by Procter and Gamble of Clorox
was properly held to have eliminated potential competition. Cer-
tainly potential competition is an important factor in the behavior
of a market. In a competitive market where there are no barriers
to entry, existing competitors cannot charge prices substantially
higher than market without encouraging entry. On the other hand,
in an industry where specialized resources and know-how are im-
portant, the members of an industry could effectively charge above
market price if no potential competitor existed. Thus if it were
known that no such competitors existed, the members of the
industry could assume that a certain period of time would be neces-
sary before someone could be in the position to enter the market.
If potential competitors, such as companies selling the same prod-
21 A product extension merger is the merger of a company into a closely
related field. The Proctor & Gamble-Clorox merger is a good example.
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uct in different geographic markets or companies selling similar but
different products in the same market, did exist, however, the mem-
bers would have to assume that such companies would enter when
the price in the industry was substantially above cost. We would
expect, therefore, that the members of the industry would act with
discretion and not invite such entry. The fact that potential com-
petitors exist, however, does not stop the members of the industry
from charging prices above cost. The extent of freedom enjoyed
by members of the industry depends upon the scale of entry. If
the scale of entry must be large, either because national advertising
is involved or because the plant must be large to be efficient, then
entry by a new competitor will not occur until demand in the
industry can justify the additional production. Thus if new entry
must be on a scale involving twenty percent of the market, entry
will not occur until the existing producers are producing less than
eighty percent of the demand, since entry on such a large scale
would impose losses both on the entrant and on the industry as a
whole. The necessary scale of entry probably explains why merger
is the only certain way to enter industries. The necessary scale
also explains why members of existing oligopolistically organized
industries can safely ignore potential competition when potential
entrants must enter on a large scale. From this analysis it would
seem that new entry would occur only in an expanding industry
where existing firms would not be able to keep up with production
or where the scale of entry was small enough so that a potential
competitor would not increase the total product of the industry so
as to impose losses on all members of the industry. Entry by merger
would occur when the opposite conditions exist. The only difficult
case involves the product extension merger. For example, an exist-
ing oil company might enter a new geographic market by using
only slight increases in outlets or advertising without imposing
losses on the whole industry. Conversely, a completely new oil
company might, because of the necessary advertising and outlets,
have to enter on a grand scale and cause losses. Thus we can justify
the prohibition of a merger involving geographically related com-
panies because they are potential competitors. Furthermore, po-
tential competitors with know-how and the capability of new
entry can be induced by an attractive merger offer not to enter
when the market conditions would warrant new entry whereas
others without these qualifications would be disregarded entirely.
This may have occurred in the Proctor and Gamble-Clorox case.
One could conclude, therefore, that most conglomerate mergers
do not take the place of new entries and that when such mergers
do replace a new entrant, it is in the product extension field. One
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could also conclude that the potential competitors who most effec-
tively control an existing market are those competitors that have
the finances, personnel, and know-how immediately to enter the
field, and that such competitors are likely to be companies in the
same or closely related fields. The Justice Department and the
F.T.C. are wrong when they attack unrelated conglomerate mergers
because such mergers eliminate potential competitors; they are
right when they attack product and geographic extension mergers.
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION
The last reason given by the staff of the F.T.C. for stopping
conglomerate mergers is to stop cross-subsidization-that is, to stop
a large company from subsidizing its losses in one division by
profits from another. Such cross-subsidization is not peculiar to
conglomerates. In fact the examples the F.T.C. uses do not involve
conglomerates at all. The F.T.C. points to the attempt by Safeway
in its Dallas and El Paso divisions to take twenty-five percent of the
market in large cities and fifty percent of the market in small towns,
by the use of sales near or below cost. The staff concluded:
In short, it would appear that Safeway was quite willing and
able to employ competitive tactics resulting in substantial losses
in one of its major divisions over an extended period of time, pre-
sumably because these losses would have no serious adverse effect
on overall profit performance. 22
Another example offered by the F.T.C. is that of Anheuser-
Busch. As the Commission sees the case, Anheuser-Busch retaliated
against local brewers for refusing to follow an Anheuser-Busch
price rise after a union contract. The facts show that there was
normally a certain price differential between premium and local
beers. Thus, when in response to a labor settlement Anheuser-
Busch raised its price along with all the national beers, it became
vulnerable to the competition of local beers, since the local brew-
eries refused to raise prices. Anheuser-Busch then retaliated by
cutting prices, even to the extent of cutting out the premium differ-
ential. The F.T.C. found that the effect of this action was to insure
that the local breweries would follow the next rise in prices, and
they did do so.23
The third staff example was the only one of a product extension
conglomerate merger. National Dairy Products acquired Bedford
22 FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 420.
23 Id. at 421-32. See also In re Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 287-
88 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), order again set aside, 289 F.2d 835 (7th
Cir. 1961).
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Products, a producer of jams and jellies for private label. In 1956,
National shifted Bedford production to a national distribution of
jams and jellies under the Kraft label. After extensive advertising
on television, in magazines, newspapers, etc., National doubled the
production of Bedford and became the largest producers of full-
line jams and jellies. In 1961, National, dissatisfied with its share of
the market, in effect cut its price in half in the Washington market.
It gave away one case of jellies and jams for each one purchased
during a twenty-six day period. At this new price, it sold 400,803
cases as compared to 27,994 cases sold during the same period the
year before. The Commission again concludes that only because
National sold in other places could it engage in such activity. Of
course such activity was a violation of section 2(a) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act.24
These three cases do not prove what the Commission claims
they prove. First, neither Safeway nor Anheuser-Busch are con-
glomerates. National Dairy may be a conglomerate, but its action
could be as easily explained if it produced only jams and jellies
on a national scale. What it does show is that in a somewhat con-
centrated market, companies with larger cash resources than their
competitors have market strategies available to them that are not
available to their competitors. Not simply because a company is a
conglomerate or because it has other markets in which it sells can
it use a price-cutting strategy; such a company can cut prices
simply because it has cash reserves. In addition to cash reserves,
the company must believe that if it uses these cash reserves to
lower prices in a local market it can permanently obtain a larger
share of that market or insure that the competitors will not compete
against it in the future. The use of economic muscle can and has
been used to enforce various market arrangements but it must be
justified by the expected return in the particular market, not on the
fact that another market exists. On the other hand, the price dis-
crimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act,25 making it
illegal for a national seller to cut prices in a particular market (ex-
cept defensively), do protect local or regional sellers from the
strategy outlined above. For in all these cases it would have been
too expensive for the national concerns needlessly to cut prices
in all of their markets in order to gain particular advantages in a
local market. The problem of the affluent competitor cannot be
solved either by allowing or prohibiting conglomerate mergers.
It is true that in certain circumstances a subsidiary of a conglomer-
24 FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 432-43.
25 Robinson-Patman Act § 2 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1964).
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ate would be better able to cut prices than a division of Safeway
or Kraft because the price discrimination provisions of the Robin-
son-Patman Act would not apply to the subsidiary cutting prices.
Nonetheless, the only time this would be a problem is when the
conglomerate mergers enter into an industry where the companies
have small financial resources in relation to the conglomerates and
nationwide or marketwide price cutting was feasible.
The Reynolds Aluminum 6 and Procter and Gamble27 mergers
show the greatest danger of such activity. In these cases, the com-
pany buying Arrow, Reynolds Aluminum, and Procter and Gamble,
the company buying Clorox, were well financed compared to the
companies in the business. Reynolds and Procter and Gamble could
demand a stabilized proportion of the business under a realistic
threat to impose losses on other members of the particular industry.
The other members knew that losses could be imposed upon them
and that they could not impose substantial losses on Procter and
Gamble or Reynolds without a suicidal loss to themselves.
We must recognize that no company, no matter how rich, would
lose money to drive out or discipline competitors if that company
were not reasonably sure that after the competitors were disciplined
or driven out of business it would not be necessary to do it again.28
These companies can be reasonably assured that their actions will
be successful if the market structure has entry barriers because of
strong product differentiation. In markets where conglomerates
merge with small companies and there is therefore a large differ-
ential in financial resources, it would seem that the only defense
against such new merged companies would be a counter-merger
of the same sort. Such a change in market structure again would
tend to limit entry, and would, therefore, properly be held illegal
under section seven of the Clayton Act.2 9
On the other hand, most of the important conglomerate merger
cases do not involve the merger of a large conglomerate into a
small concentrated industry and hence we would not expect cross-
subsidization. The use of financial muscle may be profitable only
if one knows that he can soon drive the other parties to their knees,
since substantial losses taken for any reasonable period of time gen-
erally cannot be made up. We would expect, therefore, that cross-
26 Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
27 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 586 (1967).
28 For a full discussion, see Rudolph, The Rationale Behind the Fore-
closure Doctrine, 46 NEB. L. REV. 605, 609 (1966).
29 Id. at 607-08.
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subsidization would not result whenever the competitors of the
acquired company have substantial financial resources. Thus, in
merger cases this argument is limited to the special situation out-
lined in Clorox or Reynolds, and cannot be used to deny proposed
mergers such as the I.T.T.-Hartford Insurance Merger.
CONCLUSION
The staff report seems to indicate that the motive for most
conglomerate mergers lies not in some sort of market control but
in the stock market's premium for growth companies and in the
failure of tax laws to tax exchanges of stock. An examination of the
twenty-five most active acquiring companies shows that they have
acquired fifty-nine percent of the assets held by the top 200 cor-
porations.30 Among those twenty-five are the best-known conglom-
erates. Except for the petroleum companies, which are geographic
product extension cases, it may be difficult to show that any of the
ill effects just discussed could or would arise from these conglom-
erate mergers. For example, it is impossible to see how L.T.V.'s
acquisition of Wilson and Company, a meat packer and sporting
goods firm, Jones and Laughlin, a steel firm, and Braniff, an air-
line, could result in reciprocal buying or elimination of a potential
competitor or, for that matter, cross-subsidization. It is hard to
imagine that Jones and Laughlin would attempt to discipline U.S.
Steel or Bethlehem for not following a price set by Jones and
Laughlin.
If such is the case, one wonders how the Attorney General hopes
to stop the merger of any of the top 200 with each other or with
a leading firm in any field. Thus the antitrust suit brought by the
government involving the acquisition by International Telephone
and Telegraph of Hartford Fire Insurance Company and Grinnell
Corporation 3' has run into difficulty, as well as has its suit against
the attempt by Northwest Industries to acquire B. F. Goodrich.3 2
In both these cases, as well as its case against L.T.V., the Govern-
ment has made the claim that reciprocal buying and the elimination
of potential competition will result. The Government also claims
that such a merger will increase the current trend of acquisitions
of dominant firms in concentrated markets by large companies,
thereby increasing the concentration of control of manufacturing
assets, increasing the barriers to entry in concentrated markets,
and diminishing the vigor of competition by increasing actual and
30 FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 258 et seq.
31 United States v. International Tel. & Tel., 1969 Trade Cas. 87,633.
32 United States v. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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potential customer-supplier relationships among leading firms in
concentrated markets.33
As previously indicated, no economic theory exists that can tell
us what habpens when firms in separate markets merge. In fact,
all that economic theory seems to indicate is that to exert market
control, a company must be able to control the production in a par-
ticular market. If the claim of the Justice Department is based on
the political and social aspects of the Attorney General's speech on
Alcoa and Brown Shoe, that claim does not seem to meet the legal
standards for the application of such a rule. In addition, it is clear
that most of the merger activity among the top 200 firms has not
involved the top fifty firms. Obviously larger concentrations of
assets are immune from such an attack. To make new political
standards meaningful, we must adopt into law some standard other
than competition. For example, we might adopt standards like those
in the Bank Holding Company Act 34 or the I.C.C. Act.3- At present,
the only meaning that is given to the political and social language
found in the cases is that, when necessary, efficiency may be sacri-
ficed to insure competitive market control. Under such circum-
stances the Government must show how a conglomerate merger has
injured the market structure.
Moreover, we have seen that in most instances reciprocal buying,
elimination of potential competitors, or cross-subsidization does not
occur in the true conglomerate merger. In fact the I.T.T. handled
the government quite nicely with their theory of conglomerate
mergers which made each subsidiary a profit center. I.T.T. built
into its conglomerate a competitive base so that it would not pay
any division to purchase reciprocally. In that arrangement, the
managers of each subsidiary are paid on the profit that the sub-
sidiary makes and not out of the general profits of International
Telephone and Telegraph. This being so, no subsidiary managers
would engage in reciprocal purchasing. Even the F.T.C. Report 6
states that reciprocal purchasing must be pushed vigorously by the
higher officers of the companies engaged. The purchasing agents
would not buy reciprocally if it were not profitable for the managers
of the subsidiaries involved.
Without any economic theory to support it, the Government
is left simply with its general bias against bigness and especially
against the new conglomerates. Apparently no articulated theory of
33 United States v. Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (D. Pa.,
filed April 14,1969).
34 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1964).
35 49 U.S.C.§ 5 (1964).
36 Note 3 supra.
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antitrust is available to stop such mergers. Perhaps the Govern-
ment may have to retreat from its present concern with conglom-
erates and consider instead the basic question of whether oligopo-
listically organized industries should be made competitive.3 7 Such a
result would be much more productive than a series of meaningless
victories against the new conglomerates.
37 See REPORT Or THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY
(1968) (reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMIC REVIEW 11
(Winter 1968-69)).
